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Publications

Publications in scientific journals

For copyright reasons, only release versions of these articles can be downloaded from this web page. The final versions are accessible through the journals? official websites where articles are published.

  • "A Simple Model of Framework Agreements: Competition and Efficiency", (2008), Journal of Public Procurement (G.L. Albano and M. Sparro). The paper was awarded the "Best Full Length Paper Award" at the 3rd International Public Procurement Conference (Amsterdam, August 2008)
  • "Bidding for Complex Projects: Evidence from Italian Government's Acquisition of IT Services" (2009), in M.A. Wimmer et al. (Eds.) "EGOV 2009", Springer-Verlag (G.L. Albano, F. Dini, and R. Zampino)
  • "Regulating Joint Bidding in Public Procurement", (2009), Journal of Competition Law and Economics,(G.L. Albano, G. Spagnolo and M. Zanza)

Other papers, coauthored by members of the Research Unit, have been collected in the "Handbook of Procurement" by N. Dimitri, G. Piga, and G. Spagnolo (Eds.), Cambridge University Press, 2006

Publications in the series "Quaderni Consip":

  • New Developments of the National Law on Public Contracts.An economic analysis is conducted on Framework Agreements, Dynamic Purchasing System, and e-auctions.   
  • Standards and innovation.The paper provides an overview of economic arguments as to what extent the adoption of standards foster rather than hamper innovations. Two case studies (function points and knowledge management) are also discussed.
  • The problem of quality in the acquisition of goods and services.The paper addresses the following questions: How to ensure the appropriate level of quality of public purchases? Is there a link between quality (i.e., contract) enforcement and bidding strategies at the tendering stage? What role would reputational mechanisms play in enforcing the ?desidered? levels of quality?
  • Scoring Rules. The paper analyzes the properties of the main families of scoring rules.
  • Reserve Prices. The paper borrows from recent developments in auction theory to highlight the effect of the level of the reserve price on competition and participation in competitive tendering.
  • Multi-lot Competitions and Combinatorial auctions. The paper explores the potential benefits of splitting procurement contracts into lots and allowing package bidding in terms of fostering the participation of smaller firms and the ability of bigger firms to exploit economies of scale.
  • Division in lots and Competition in auctions. The effects of the division into lots on auction participation, competition and risks of agreements between competitors.
  • Reputational Mechanisms and Electronic markets.Some key elements for the construction of an efficient feedback mechanism, and some solutions for the Electronic Market of Public Administration.
  • The Practice of Public Procurement in Europe.An exploratory analysis of centralized public procurement practices adopted in some European countries.